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BEYOND GOVERNMENT TRANSPARENCY IN CHINA? 




Since May 1, 2008, the Regulations on Open Government 
Information (OGI Regulations) enacted by the PRC State Council on 
April 5, 2007, have formally established a legal mandate for 
information disclosure from all government agencies nationwide.1  
Over the past 13 years, attention has focused on increasing 
transparency in a political system long shrouded in secrecy.  Scholars 
have spilled a tremendous amount of ink on this area of law.2  Yet 
one issue remains relatively untrodden, if not unknown, among 
 
            † Research Fellow at the Center of Constitutional and Administrative Law at 
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             1 For an early English analysis, see JAMIE P. HORSLEY, CHINA ADOPTS FIRST 
NATIONWIDE OPEN GOVERNMENT INFORMATION REGULATION (May, 9, 2007), 
http://www.freedominfo.org/2007/05/china-adopts-first-nationwide-open-
government-information-regulations/ [https://perma.cc/MT4J-S8Z7]. 
 2 The Chinese literature on this topic is enormous.  With limited space, only 
English literature will be mentioned here.  For monographs, see JONATHAN 
STROMSETH ET AL., CHINA’S GOVERNANCE PUZZLE: ENABLING TRANSPARENCY 
AND PARTICIPATION IN A SINGLE-PARTY (2017) (analyzing the practical impact of 
China’s government transparency initiative over the last decade, especially with 
regard to the anti-corruption fight).  For journal articles, see, e.g., Aviva 
Chengcheng Liu, Two Faces of Transparency: The Regulations of People’s 
Republic of China on Open Government Information, 39 INT’L PUB. ADMIN. 492 
(2016) (pointing out that Chinese government tailors information disclosure to 
meet the institutional requirement of strengthening internal accountability 
mechanisms); Suzanne J. Piotrowski et al., Key Issues for Implementation of 
Chinese Open Government Information Regulations, 69 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 129 
(2009) (identifying important issues influencing China’s transparency 
performance such as government capacity, resources, public awareness and so 
on); Renu Rana, China’s Information Disclosure Initiative: Assessing the 
Reforms, 51 CHINA REP. 129 (2015) (analyzing the legal, political and structural 
problems obstructing the successful implementation of China’s transparency law). 
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scholars and observers interested in the Chinese transparency regime;  
that is, transparency of public enterprises and institutions.3 
“Public enterprises and institutions” is a literal translation of 
the Chinese term “公共企事业单位.”  The term does not translate 
very easily into English because the West has no close parallel.  This 
type of organization traces back to the pre-reform era when the 
Chinese government took on expansive political, social, and 
economic functions through the unique danwei system.  A danwei is 
an enclosed, multifunctional, and self-sufficient entity, constituting 
 
 3 The only English scholarly work on this topic is by Paula Hubbard & Xiao 
Weibing, Open Government Information in Chinese State-owned Enterprises, 22 
INFO. SOC’Y 57 (2017) (discussing the patchy implementation of China’s open 
government information law with respect to its state-owned enterprises). The 
Chinese scholarship on this issue is also quite sparse with just one monograph and 
a handful of journal articles.  See generally GUO TAIHE, GONGYONG QIYE XINXI 
GONGKAI YANJIU (公用企业信息公开研究) [RESEARCH ON OPEN INFORMATION 
OF PUBLIC ENTERPRISES] (2015) (discussing generally the status quo of 
transparency performance of China’s public enterprises); Zhu Mang, Gonggong 
Qishiye Danwei Ying Ruhe Xinxi Gongkai (公共企事业单位应如何信息公开) 
[How Shall Public Enterprises and Institutions Implement Open Government 
Information Law], 2 ZHONG GUO FA XUE (中国法学) (2013) (arguing that the 
open government information law shall apply to public enterprises and 
institutions to the maximum extent); Zhang Haotian, Lun Gonggong Qiye de 
Xinxi Gongkai Zhuti Zige (论公共企业的信息公开主体资格) [On the 
Applicability of the Open Government Information Law to Public Enterprises], 2 
JIAO DA FA XUE (交大法學) (2016) (identifying the type of public enterprises 
that should be subject to the open government information legislation)；Jun 
Wang, Gonggong Qishiye Danwei Xinxi Gongkai: Yiju, Lujing yu Biaozhun (公共
企事业单位信息公开：依据、路径与标准) [Information Disclosure of Public 
Enterprises and Institutions: Basis, Path and Standards], 11 ZHONG GUO 
XINGZHENG GUANLI (中国行政管理) (2018) (suggesting how the OGI 
Regulations shall apply to public enterprises and institutions); Yi Liang, 
Gonggong Qishiye Danwei Xinxi Gongkai de Shiyong Jianshi yu Xiuzheng: Dui 
Zhengfu Xinxi Gongkai Tiaoli Canzhao Tiaokuan jiqi Xiuding de Pingjia (公共
企事业单位信息公开的适用检视与修正——对《政府信息公开条例》参照
条款及其修订的评价) [Evaluating and Improving Information Disclosure of 
Public Enterprises and Institutions: Assessment of  the Referential Article of the 
OGI Regulations and its Revision], 9 HE BEI FA XUE (河北法学) (2020) 
(analyzing the revision of the article on information disclosure of public 
enterprises and institutions in 2019); Haibo Lu, Hongzhi Meng, Gonggong 
Qishiye Danwei Xinxi Gongkai de Lujing Xuanze: Xinxing Guanzhuang Bingdu 
Feiyan Yiqing Yinfa de Falv Sikao (公共企事业单位信息公开的路径选择——
新型冠状病毒肺炎疫情引发的法律思考) [Path Selection of Information 
Disclosure of Public Enterprises and Institutions: Legal Reflections prompted by 
the Covid-19 Pandemic], 2 HENAN DAXUE XUEBAO (河南大学学报) (2020) 
(evaluating the revision of Article 37 of the OGI Regulations against the 
background of Covid-19 pandemic). 
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the most basic collective unit in the Chinese political and social order.  
Politically, danwei is a mechanism through which the state controls 
members of the cadre corps, monitors ordinary citizens, and carries 
out its policies.  Economically and socially, danwei fulfills social and 
communal needs of its members, including housing, dining, 
education, healthcare, and so on.4  A Chinese danwei usually falls 
into one of the three following categories: (1) party and state agencies 
and departments (called dangzheng jiguan), (2) state-owned 
enterprises (called qiye danwei), and (3) state-sponsored institutions 
(called shiye danwei).5  In the pre-reform period, while the state-
owned enterprises (SOEs) performed primarily productive functions, 
the state-sponsored institutions played a whole host of nonproductive 
roles, such as market regulation, research and education, media and 
press, and service and welfare provision. 6   Notwithstanding the 
difference in functions, both SOEs and state-sponsored institutions 
were essentially funded by the public purse.  During the reform era, 
SOEs and state-sponsored institutions underwent successive rounds 
of reforms to readjust the state-society relationship in China.  The 
main objective of state sector reform was to downsize government 
control to leave more space for the market and civil society.7  This 
article does not have the space to engage in extensive discussion of 
these reforms, though they are of great importance themselves.  
Suffice to say, until today, such reforms are still unfinished, and 
public enterprises and institutions continue to perform a variety of 
public functions and/or to receive public funds.  For instance, despite 
the increasing presence of private universities (including Sino-
foreign joint universities), more than 60 percent of higher education 
institutions in China and all of the most elite ones among them 
(enlistees of the famous 985 and 211 projects) remain publicly funded, 
 
 4 See ELIZABETH PERRY & LU XIAOBO, DANWEI: THE CHANGING CHINESE 
WORKPLACE IN HISTORICAL AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 8–12 (Elizabeth 
Perry & Lu Xiaobo eds., 1998). 
             5 Id. at 6–7. 
             6 Id. at 7, 9. 
 7 For a recent account of China’s SOE and state-sponsored institutions 
reforms over the years, see LAM TAO CHIU, GLOBALIZATION AND PUBLIC SECTOR 
REFORM IN CHINA CHINA (Kjeld Erik BrØdsgaard ed., 2014), especially Chapters 
6 and 7.  For relevant discussion from the legal perspective, see Zhou Hanhua, 
China’s Regulatory Reform: Experiences, Challenges, and Prospects, 13 U. PA. 
ASIAN L. REV. 1 (2018). 
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enrolling more than 70 percent of college students in the country.8  
Likewise, private hospitals have grown exponentially since the 1990s 
and in the end of 2017 there were more than 18,000 private hospitals 
in China, accounting for 60 percent of the total number of hospitals.  
Yet there were only 490 million visits to these private healthcare 
institutions, which counted less than 15 percent of total visits.9 
 What then are the legal transparency requirements for these 
public enterprises and institutions?  In Chinese administrative law, 
the government consists of two types of organizations: one is 
administrative organs (xingzheng jiguan) and the other is the so called 
empowered organization, which are entities empowered by laws, 
administrative regulations and rules to perform the functions of 
public affairs administration (falü fagui guizhang shouquan zuzhi).10  
Under the 2008 OGI Regulations, the transparency requirements for 
these organizations are covered in the first 36 articles.  Article 37 goes 
on to lay the statutory ground for openness of public enterprises and 
institutions: “Disclosing information that is made or obtained in the 
course of providing public services by public enterprises and 
institutions that are closely related to the people’s interests such as 
education, medical care, family planning, water supply, electricity 
supply, gas supply, heating, environmental protection and public 
transportation shall be done with reference to these Regulations.  The 
specific measures shall be formulated by competent departments or 
 
 8 Private Universities Increasingly Important in China: Report, XINHUA 
(Oct. 18, 2017), http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-10/18/c_136689356.htm 
[https://perma.cc/K5GY-HFP5]; Kai Yu, The Consolidation of Chinese Private 
Higher Education, UNIVERSITY WORLD NEWS, 
https://www.universityworldnews.com/post.php?story=20181003094521393 
[https://perma.cc/ZDU4-KGEV]. 
 9 Zheng Yiran, Future of Private Medical Institutions Looks Promising, 
CHINA DAILY (Sept. 21, 2018), 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201809/21/WS5ba456e5a310c4cc775e780e.html 
[https://perma.cc/F2MQ-5X9U]. 
            10 Article 2 of the Administrative Litigation Law prescribes that decisions 
made by both of these organizations are open to judicial review.  Zhonghua 
Renmin Gongheguo Xingzheng Susong Fa (Administrative Litigation Law of the 
People’s Republic of China) [中华人民共和国行政诉讼法] (promulgated by 
Standing Comm.Nat’l People’s Cong., Nov. 1, 2014, effective May 1, 2015), art. 
2, https://www.chinafile.com/ngo/laws-regulations/administrative-litigation-law-
of-peoples-republic-of-china-2015-amended-version [https://perma.cc/9TND-
78R9] (last visited Apr. 20, 2021). 
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offices of the State Council.”11  Apparently, public enterprises and 
institutions are seen to be sufficiently different from the government 
to warrant a separate clause in the 2008 OGI Regulations; yet they 
are also considered to be sufficiently similar to the government to 
disclose information with reference to the 2008 OGI Regulations.  So, 
what is the difference?  Why are these strictly speaking non-
government organizations incorporated in the government 
transparency legislation?  To what extent is this particular legal 
requirement implemented in reality?  What are the challenges in 
enforcing compliance with openness requirements from such 
organizations? 
Eleven years after the promulgation of the 2008 OGI 
Regulations, a set of amendments were introduced for the first time, 
and the revised law became effective on May 15, 2019.12  With regard 
to the public enterprises and institutions, two significant changes 
have been made in the new Article 55, compared to Article 37 of the 
2008 OGI Regulations.  First, the OGI Regulations will no longer be 
the legal basis according to which public enterprises and institutions 
disclose information; second, citizens aggrieved by non-disclosure 
decisions made by public enterprises and institutions may appeal to 
the relevant supervisory administrative departments, which means 
administrative litigation, the previously available remedy, is no 
longer available.  What are the underlying reasons for these changes? 
Are they moving in the right direction towards tackling challenges 
related to the openness of public enterprises and institutions in China? 
This article sets out to explore these issues and will proceed 
in five parts.  Part 1 explains the legal framework of open public 
enterprises and institutions in China, especially what sets them apart 
from administrative organs and empowered organizations under the 
2008 OGI Regulations.  The section goes on to reveal the overlooked 
 
 11 This is largely based on the translation done by the Paul Tsai China Center 
at Yale Law School.  For the full text, see Regulation of the People’s Republic of 
China on Open Government Information (promulgated by St. Council, Jan. 17, 
2007, effective May 1, 2008), 
https://law.yale.edu/system/files/documents/pdf/Intellectual_Life/CL-OGI-Regs-
English.pdf [https://perma.cc/6PDU-S5TM] (last visited Feb. 14, 2019) 
[hereinafter 2008 OGI Regulations]. 
           12  The English translation of the amended OGI Regulations can be found at  
https://www.chinalawtranslate.com/en/open-government-information-regulations-
of-the-p-r-c-2019/ [https://perma.cc/4X2N-6JCM] (last visited Feb. 2, 2021) 
[hereinafter 2019 OGI Regulations]. 
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dualistic structure within China’s transparency law and explain the 
2019 amendments that reinforce that structure as well as the fourfold 
conventional wisdom that underpins the recent legal changes.  Part 2 
reports and assesses the transparency performance of Chinese public 
enterprises and institutions since the enactment of the 2008 OGI 
Regulations, particularly in comparison to that of the administrative 
organs.  It will make clear that public enterprises and institutions have 
had a rather poor transparency record over the last decade or so, due 
to a lack of hierarchical pressure from the government departments 
responsible for overseeing their operation.  Part 3 proceeds to 
demonstrate that the Chinese judiciary has been active yet prudent in 
scrutinizing public enterprises and institutions’ compliance with the 
2008 OGI Regulations, in spite of the institutional barriers created by 
the dualistic structure.  Part 4 argues that the incorporation of public 
enterprises and institutions into the OGI Regulations is consistent 
with both the Chinese constitutional imperative for participatory 
democracy and the international mainstream of including non-
governmental entities performing public functions and/or receiving 
public funds in the freedom of information legislation.  The 
conclusion summarizes the article and makes proposals for further 
reforms in this area. 
II. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF OPEN PUBLIC 
ENTERPRISES AND INSTITUTIONS AND ITS RECENT 
CHANGES 
As mentioned above, under the 2008 OGI Regulations, public 
enterprises and institutions are different from the administrative 
organs and empowered organizations. The most crucial difference 
lies in that the 2008 OGI Regulations are not to be implemented in 
toto vis-à-vis public enterprises and institutions.  To use the exact 
wording of Article 37, information disclosure by public enterprises 
and institutions “shall be done with reference to these Regulations,” 
or in Chinese “canzhao.”13  This is clearly distinct from the legal 
obligations of the government, including administrative organs and 
empowered organizations, to release information according to the 
2008 OGI Regulations, or in Chinese “shiyong.”14  In other words, 
 
            13 2008 OGI Regulations, supra note 11, at art. 37. 
            14 Id. at arts. 3, 4. 
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there is a dualistic structure internal to China’s transparency system: 
with regards to administrative organs and empowered organizations, 
the OGI Regulations must be enforced; yet concerning public 
enterprises and institutions, the OGI Regulations are to be referred to.  
What explains this embedded dualism?  The widely accepted reason 
is that under Chinese administrative law, only the administrative 
organs and the empowered organizations are considered 
administrative subjects (xingzheng zhuti), which refer to those 
organizations that can become defendants in China’s administrative 
litigation or judicial review.  Public enterprises and institutions are 
not administrative subjects since they are not regarded as part of the 
administrative machinery.15   Therefore, while both administrative 
subjects and non-administrative subjects shoulder legal duties to 
release information under the 2008 OGI Regulations, only the former 
is subject to administrative litigation prescribed in Article 33 with 
respect to their disclosing activities.16  As non-administrative subjects, 
public enterprises and institutions are in theory immune to the 
scrutiny of judicial review regarding their disclosing decisions, even 
though they are legally bound to engage in such activities.  Hence 
there is this distinction between “with reference to/canzhao” and 
“according to/shiyong” as the application of the 2008 OGI 
Regulations to public enterprises and institutions is not wholesale but 
rather excludes Article 33.17 
 
          15 Xue Gangling, Woguo Xingzheng Zhuti Lilun zhi Jiantao (我国行政主体理
论之检讨) [An Critical Assessment of the Theory on Administrative Subjects in 
China], 6 ZHENGFA LUNTAN (政法论坛) (1998). 
          16 As mentioned before, the 2008 OGI Regulations cover both administrative 
organs and empowered organizations. Yet only the former organs are considered 
administrative subjects open to administrative litigation.   
 17 Hou Xiangdong, Lun Woguo Zhengfu Xinxi Gongkai Zhidu Biange zhong 
de Ruogan Zhognda Wenti (论我国政府信息公开制度变革中的若干重大问题) 
[On Several Significant Issues Concerning the Reforms of China’s Open 
Government Information System], 5 XINGZHENG FAXUE YANJIU (行政法学研究) 
99, 103 (2017).  One specific point worthy of clarification here is that in some 
instances public enterprises and institutions can be proper defendants in 
administrative litigation.  For example, public universities in China have long 
been subject to judicial review, particularly involving disputes about universities’ 
disciplinary decisions in the forms of revocation of degrees.  However, they 
become defendants in administrative litigation not as non-administrative subjects, 
but as empowered organizations under Article 8 of the Degree Regulations and 
Article 22 of the Education Law, which confer degree-conferral power upon 
universities.  See Zhan Zhongle, Zailun Woguo Gongli Gaodeng Xuexiao zhi Falv 
Diwei (再论我国公立高等学校之法律地位) [On the Legal Status of Public 
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As mentioned above, the 2019 amendments to the OGI 
Regulations strengthened the dualistic structure, albeit in an altered 
fashion.  Specifically, two major changes were introduced by Article 
55 of the amended legislation. 18   First, although the 2019 OGI 
Regulations still includes one article on transparency requirements 
for public enterprises and institutions, they will no longer be the legal 
basis for non-administrative disclosure activities.  The newly added 
Article 55, which replaced the original Article 37, prescribes in its 
first paragraph that information disclosure by public enterprises and 
institutions shall now be done according to rules established by the 
relevant departments under the State Council that oversee public 
enterprises and institutions, and that the national agency in charge of 
open government information affairs (i.e. the General Office of State 
Council) may enact special rules for this area if and when necessary. 
On December 21, 2020, the General Office of State Council 
issued the Measures for Formulating Public Enterprise and 
Institution Information Disclosure Provisions, urging supervisory 
administrative departments to establish rules in this respect, as 
required by Article 55 of the 2019 OGI Regulations.19  Particularly, 
its Article 5 stipulates that the method of information disclosure by 
public enterprises and institutions shall mainly be proactive 
disclosure, and disclosure on request shall not in principle be 
adopted. 20   Given that the government is obligated to disclose 
information both proactively and upon request, this means that 
disclosure requirements for the public enterprises and institutions are 
now distinct.  Second, in recognition of the institutional limitation on 
public enterprises and institutions as non-administrative subjects that 
are immune to administrative litigation, the second paragraph of 
Article 55 of the 2019 OGI Regulations prescribes that when there 
are grievances about public enterprises and institutions’ openness, 
 
Higher Education Institutions in China], 7 ZHONGUO JIAOYU FAZHI PINGLUN (中
国教育法制评论) 30, 33 (2009). 
            18 2019 OGI Regulations, supra note 12, at art. 55. 
            19 Id. Article 55 of the 2019 OGI Regulations prescribes that the competent 
departments for open government information work for the entire nation are to 
draft special provisions as required by actual conditions. 
            20 The full text English translation can be found at 
https://www.chinalawtranslate.com/en/public-enterprise-institution-ogi/ 
[https://perma.cc/4X2N-6JCM] (last visited Feb. 2, 2021) [hereinafter 2020 State 
Council General Office Measures]. 
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citizens must file complaints to the relevant departments overseeing 
public enterprises and institutions and those departments must 
promptly handle these complaints and notify the petitioners about the 
results.21  Administrative litigation is no longer available.  This has 
been reaffirmed by Article 8 of the 2020 State Council General Office 
Measures. 
The recent legal changes entrench the dualistic structure 
within the OGI Regulations system.  Previously, public enterprises 
and institutions shared the same transparency obligations as 
administrative organs and the empowered organizations, as specified 
by the 2008 OGI Regulations, but under the 2019 OGI Regulations, 
public enterprises and institutions now face a new set of special rules 
established by their oversight government departments (hereinafter 
the “oversight departments”), or in Chinese zhuguan bumen.  Based 
on what has been mandated about the disclosure method by the 2020 
State Council General Office Measures, the difference between 
special oversight rules and the OGI Regulations will indeed be 
substantive.  Moreover, prior to the 2019 amendments, even though 
public enterprises and institutions were in theory non-administrative 
subjects, they have remained ambivalent about whether their 
disclosure activities could be challenged through judicial review.  
After all, the 2008 OGI Regulations do not unequivocally state that 
public enterprises and institutions are absolutely exempt from 
administrative litigation.  That is now changed in the 2019 OGI 
Regulations by Article 51 (stipulating that administrative litigation 
applies to administrative agencies) and Article 55 (stipulating that 
citizens ought to challenge public enterprises and institutions’ 
disclosure decisions via a complaint mechanism) of the draft 
amendments.22  It has finally been made clear that public enterprises 
and institutions will be free from judicial review for their open 
information activities.  In summary, it is fair to say that the gap 
between the non-administrative subjects and the administrative 
subjects under the OGI Regulations has widened and the dualism 
embedded therein reinforced. 
The rationale behind these changes is four-fold, as explained 
by the Deputy Director of the Office of Open Government Affairs 
under the General Office of State Council, who was intimately 
 
          21 2019 OGI Regulations, supra note 12, at art. 55. 
          22 2019 OGI Regulations, supra note 12, at arts. 51, 55. 
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involved in the drafting of the 2019 amendments.23  First, because 
public enterprises and institutions do not qualify as administrative 
subjects, they are usually unable to enter into administrative litigation.  
Even if they become defendants, it is difficult, if not impossible, for 
the courts to review the legality of their disclosure decisions because 
it remains ambiguous how the OGI Regulations apply when they are 
for reference rather than strict obligation for public enterprises and 
institutions.  Second, the responsibility of ensuring public enterprises 
and institutions’ transparency, including settling grievances arising 
from lack thereof, is better entrusted to the oversight departments 
than to the judiciary.  Compared to the judiciary, the oversight 
departments are in a better position to enforce disclosure 
requirements vis-à-vis public enterprises and institutions since they 
are directly superior to and in charge of public enterprises and 
institutions within the administrative hierarchy. 24   Third, public 
enterprises and institutions should be considered regulatees whose 
transparency obligations are different from the freedom of 
information requirements that apply more generally to the 
government, and closer to compulsory disclosure requirements 
imposed on listed companies or charitable organizations.25  Whereas 
the former fosters a transparent political regime, the latter aims at a 
well-regulated market and society.  Thus the terms for open public 
enterprises and institutions should be provided by those rules for 
specific areas of regulation, for example, special rules promulgated 
by relevant oversight departments as regulators, rather than by the 
general freedom of information legislation.26  The fourth and last 
official rationale is that globally the freedom of information laws 
primarily target government agencies rather than non-government 
organizations.  By enlisting public enterprises and institutions, the 
Chinese OGI Regulations deviated from the mainstream in the world.  
It was deemed necessary to realign with international standards by 
 
 23 Hou, supra note 17. 
 24 Id. 
 25 In China, such disclosure requirements are not specified in the OGI 
Regulations but in the Securities Law of 2014 (Article 65) and Charity Law of 
2016 (Article 69). 
 26 Hou Xiangdong, Lun Xinxi Gongkai de Wuzhong Jiben Leixing (论信息公
开的五种基本类型) [On Five Basic Types of Open Information] 1 CHINESE PUB. 
ADMIN. (中国行政管理) 27, 32 (2015). 
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taking public enterprises and institutions out of the OGI 
Regulations.27 
The proposed legislation, while perhaps well-intentioned and 
based on conventional wisdom, is misinformed and misdirected.  The 
rest of this article refutes these four official arguments.  The next 
section will show that over the ten years, between 2008 and 2018 
when the recent amendments were first announced, the transparency 
performance of public enterprises and institutions has been far from 
satisfactory principally because the oversight departments have done 
little to tackle the issue of transparency at all. 
III. THE LACKLUSTER TRANSPARENCY PERFORMANCE 
OF PUBLIC ENTERPRISES AND INSTITUTIONS AND ITS 
CAUSES 
As previously discussed, Article 37 of the 2008 OGI 
Regulations poses a general requirement that public enterprises and 
institutions in a series of sectors shall disclose information with 
reference to the OGI Regulations.  A comprehensive survey of the 
transparency performance of public enterprises and institutions is 
outside the scope of this article.  In short, the application of the 2008 
OGI Regulations to public enterprises and institutions has been 
patchy and in fact less effective than to the government agencies, 
based on existing empirical findings concerning public enterprises in 
the water supply sector and public institutions in the higher education 
sector. 
By way of example, a recent review of water companies for 
31 provinces in China found that their compliance with the 2008 OGI 
Regulations has been far from ideal based on a number of metrics.  
First, while Article 31 of the 2008 OGI Regulations demands the 
issuance of an open information yearbook by March 31 annually, not 
a single water company has ever done so.28  This is in stark contrast 
to the government agencies at both the central and local levels who 
have largely implemented this mandate.29  Similarly, only in three out 
 
 27 Hou, supra note 17. 
 28 Hubbard & Xiao, supra note 3. 
 29 This is not to say that there has been a perfect record.  For instance, in 
2016, two provincial governments were late in publishing their open information 
yearbook.  Yet overall speaking, this is not much of a problem with regard to 
administrative organs because as early as 2011 all 31 provincial governments 
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of 31 provinces do a water company’s website specify that they 
accept information requests in its open information guide, or provide 
a downloadable information request form, as required by Article 19 
of the 2008 OGI Regulations, 30  whereas nearly all government 
agencies have set up online channels to receive open information 
requests. 
The same can be said for the universities, whose openness 
record has been a far cry from impressive.  For instance, the Center 
for Education Law at the Chinese University of Political Science and 
Law reported in 2011 that although Article 10 of the 2008 OGI 
Regulations demands disclosure of budgeting information—and 
specifically Article 7 of the 2010 Measure for Open Information in 
Higher Education Institutions requires universities to proactively 
disclose their annual budget to the public—none of the 112 
universities enlisted in the 211 Project, a national initiative to 
recognize the most prestigious universities in China, had ever 
published such information.31  Three years later, in 2014, a more 
broad-based research effort looking at 521 universities in six 
provinces found that only eighty-seven publish budget-related 
 
released their yearbooks on time and the quality of such yearbook has been 
noticeably better over the years.  See Wan Jing (万静), Shengbu Jiguan Xinxi 
Gongkai Nianbao yi Quanbu Fabu Guojia Minwei Guotu Ziyuan Bu Zhongguo 
Renming Yinhang yiji Hunan Sheng Jun Wei Anshi Fabu (省部机关信息公开年
报已全部发布国家民委、国土资源部、中国人民银行以及湖南省均为按时
发布) [Ministerial Departments have all Published Open Government Information 
Annual Reports with State Ethnic Affairs Commission, Ministry of Land and 
Natural Resources, People’s Bank of China and Hunan Province Publishing on 
Time], SOHU NEWS (Apr. 2, 2011, 7:57 AM), 
http://news.sohu.com/20110402/n280107345.shtml [https://perma.cc/63QB-
H94L]; Xiao Weibing (肖卫兵), Jinnian Zhengfu Xinxi Gongkai Nianbao Fabu 
Gongzuo Liangdian Duo (今年政府信息公开年报发布工作亮点多) [There Are 
Many Bright Spots in the Published Open Government Information Annual 
Reports this Year], WANGYI NEWS (Apr. 7, 2016, 11:27 AM), 
http://news.163.com/16/0407/11/BK21MLPC00014AED.html 
[https://perma.cc/X7X9-KWR2]. 
 30 Hubbard & Xiao, supra note 3. 
 31 Wan Jing (万静), 112 Suo Gaoxiao Wuyi Gongkai Jingfei Laiyuan Niandu 
Yusuan Juesuan Xinxi (112 所高校无一公开经费来源年度预决算信息) [None 
of the 112 Universities Publicized Information on Source of Revenue and Annual 
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information on their website.32  Another study revealed that out of 
343 universities across three provinces, 227 failed to publicize their 
budget-related information.33   In comparison, substantial progress 
has been made in the area of government agencies opening up their 
budgetary process.34  For instance, in 2013 all central departments 
and provincial governments and their departments published their 
annual budgets.35 
To be sure, the above is not to imply that government agencies 
in China practice impeccable transparency.  The reality is the 
opposite.36  But it does show that in relative terms the transparency 
 
 32 Chen Ying (陈盈) & Li Lei (李磊), Gaoxiao Caiwu Xinxi Gongkai de 
Xianzhuang Tantao: Jiyu Gaoxiao Yujuesuan Baobiao Xinxi Gongkai Shuju 
Shijiao (高校财务信息公开的现状探讨： 基于高校预决算报表信息公开数据
视角) [On the Status Quo of Open Financial Information in Universities: Based 
on the Data on Open Budgeting Information of Universities] 3 JIAOYU CAIKUAI 
YANJIU (教育财会研究) 45, 47 (2014). 
 33 Sun Yingying (孙颖颖), Zhongguo Gaoxiao Caiwu Xinxi Gongkai 
Xianzhuang yu Duice Fenxi: Yi Beijing Shi Shanxi Sheng he Jiangsu Sheng Weili 
(中国高校财务信息公开现状与对策分析：以北京市、陕西省和江苏省为例) 
[Analysis on Current Status of and Policy Response to Open Financial 
Information in China’s Universities: Evidence from Beijing, Shaanxi and 
Jiangsu], 3 BEIJING HANGTIAN HANGKONG DAXUE XUEBAO SHEHUI KEXUE BAN 
[J. Beijing U. Aeronautics & Astronautics (Soc. Sci. Ed.)] (北京航天航空大学学
报社会科学版) 116, 118 (2015). 
 34 Wang Luozhong (王洛忠) & Li Fan (李帆), Woguo Zhengfu Yusuan 
Gongkai de Shijian Jinzhan Xianshi Chaju yu Tisheng Lujing (我国政府预算公
开的实践进展、现实差距与提升路径) [Practical Progress, Existing Gaps and 
Ways of Improvement for Open Government Budgeting Information in China], 
10 CHINESE PUB. ADMIN. (中国行政管理)  66, 67 (2013) (suggesting that huge 
improvement has been made in disclosing government budgeting information in 
China).  Again there are still many lingering problems for government agencies’ 
open budgeting information in China, especially the quality of information 
disclosure. See Jiang Hong, Zhengfu Yusuan Xinxi Gongkai Juli Gongzhong 
Zhiqing Quan haiyou Juli (政府预算公开程度距离公众知情权还有距离) 
[There is still Gap between Open Government Budgeting Information and the 
Rights to Know of the Public], WANGYI NEWS (Dec. 10, 2018), 
http://news.163.com/15/0310/10/AKBB414K000150MB.html 
[https://perma.cc/4UKN-5M6Q]. 
 35 Lu Xin (卢馨) & Fang Ruizi (方睿孜), Woguo Yusuan Gongkai Jinzhan 
Wenti ji Jianyi: Jiyu 2013 Nian Woguo Geji Zhengfu Bumen Yusuan Gongkai 
Xiangguan Shuju de Fenxi (我国预算公开进展、问题及建议： 基于 2013 年
我国各级政府部门预算公开相关数据的分析) [Progress, Problems and 
Suggestions on Open Budgeting Information in China: Analysis based on Data 
concerning Open Budgeting Information of Various Government Departments], 7 
KUAIJI ZHI YOU  (会计之友) 88, 89 (2015). 
 36 Rana, supra note 2 (pointing out the problems and drawbacks in the 
implementation of China’s OGI Regulations, such as the absence of a clear-cut 
definition of state secrets as an exemption from transparency). 
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record of public enterprises and institutions has been notably worse 
than that of administrative agencies.  But why?  The underlying cause 
will be presented in the following analysis, which will show that the 
oversight departments have largely failed to implement the 2008 OGI 
Regulations with respect to public enterprises and institutions.  
Although the last sentence of Article 37 orders oversight 
departments to formulate specific measures for open public 
enterprises and institutions,37  there are two significant drawbacks 
regarding standard-setting in this area.  On the one hand, there was 
serious delay in promulgating such specific measures.  The Opinions 
on Several Issues concerning the Implementation of the OGI 
Regulations, published by the General Office of State Council just 
days before the OGI Regulations became effective on May 1, 2008 
stipulates in Article 19 that the oversight departments shall establish 
specific measures for open public enterprises and institutions in their 
fields by the end of October 2008.38  But it turned out that only the 
Ministry of Transport fulfilled this prescription on time; other 
oversight departments published required measures behind 
schedule. 39   On the other hand, until recently the oversight 
departments in the nine areas enumerated in Article 37 have all 
promulgated specific measures governing open public enterprises and 
institutions.40  But beyond these areas, there is no such initiative taken 
by oversight departments in the technology, culture, 
telecommunication, postal service, financial service, or social care 
sector.  Nonetheless, there does exist a need for transparent public 
enterprises and institutions in these fields. 41   Worse still, some 
oversight departments even broke their own promise to make specific 
measures.  For instance, on the same day when the 2008 OGI 
Regulations took effect, the Civil Aviation Administration of China 
issued the Specific Measures for Open Government Information of 
Civil Aviation Administrative Organs, in which Article 30 provides 
that it will formulate rules on open public enterprises and institutions 
 
          37 2008 OGI Regulations, supra note 11, at art. 37. 
          38 The full text English translation can be found at 
https://law.yale.edu/sites/default/files/documents/pdf/Intellectual_Life/CL-OGI-
State_Council_Opinions-English.pdf [https://perma.cc/KA66-7L7F] (last visited 
Apr. 20, 2021). 
 39 For a list of these specific measures, see Hubbard & Xiao, supra note 3. 
          40 Id. 
 41 Zhang, supra note 3. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/alr/vol16/iss2/2
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in the civil aviation sector.  But ten years later, that promise remains 
unfulfilled.42  Such absence of concrete guidance further compounds 
the aforementioned ambiguity inherent in the application of the 2008 
OGI Regulations to public enterprises and institutions. 
Additionally, the enforcement of transparency obligations 
against public enterprises and institutions, in terms of both top-down 
supervision and bottom-up pressure, has also been problematic.  First, 
Article 29 of the 2008 OGI Regulations suggests that internal 
evaluation of open information work should be carried out 
periodically, and Article 35 authorizes superior administrative organs 
to correct and punish subordinate agencies’ unlawful open 
information activities.43  This obviously aims to strengthen top-down 
hierarchical supervision for more transparency.  Against this 
background, over the previous decade, governments at various levels 
conducted evaluations and published results, sometimes even 
negative results without the 2008 OGI Regulations explicitly 
requiring so.  For instance, at the central level, since 2008 the 
Ministry of Land and Natural Resources has organized multiple 
rounds of top-down assessment on over 400 local branches’ online 
transparency performance.44  From 2015, the General Office of the 
State Council started a nationwide evaluation project looking at 
thousands of government websites to check their open information 
 
 42 Likewise, the State Bureau of Forestry promised in 2016 that within a year 
it would promulgate specific measures on open public enterprises and institutions, 
which has not been delivered so far.  See Guojia Linye Ju 2016 Nian Zhengfu 
Xinxi Gongkai Gongzuo Yaodian Fengong Luoshi Fang’an (2016 年国家林业局
政府信息公开工作要点分工落实方案) [State Bureau of Forestry’s 
Implementation Plans concerning Division of Work in Major Tasks in Open 
Government Information in 2016], ZHONGGUO LINYE WANG (中国林业网) (May 
16, 2016), http://www.forestry.gov.cn/main/4461/content-872406.html 
[https://perma.cc/EVW5-TQMG]. 
          43 2008 OGI Regulations, supra note 11, at arts. 29, 35. 
 44 For the latest round, see Guotu Ziyuan Bu Bangongting Guanyu Kaizhan 
2017 Niandu Guotu Ziyuan Zhengwu Xinxi Wangshang Gongkai Zhixing 
Qingkuang Jiancha Gongzuo de Tongzhi (国土资源部办公厅关于开展 2017 年
度国土资源政务信息网上公开执行情况检查工作的通知) [Circular of the 
General Office of Ministry of Land and Natural Resources on Carrying out 
Assessment Work over Online Disclosure of Land Resources Government 
Information in 2017], SOHU (Oct. 24, 2017, 5:06 PM), 
http://www.sohu.com/a/200170058_822829 [https://perma.cc/95W2-T5RF] 
(establishing the criteria and schedule for the assessment work). 
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record every quarter 45  and sanctioned those government agencies 
with a poor record.  For the evaluation in the first quarter of 2018, 
196 responsible officials were investigated and 12 removed from 
post.46  On the local level, in 2017, Gansu provincial government 
announced that over half of its prefectures were unable to pass the 
open information work assessment carried out in the previous year.47  
In early 2017, the chief of a local bureau of commerce in Hainan was 
disciplined for his bureau’s prolonged failure to update its website.48  
In contrast, top-down supervision for open public enterprises and 
institutions are virtually non-existent.  To date, no oversight 
department has ever carried out any assessment of public enterprises 
and institutions’ transparency record and there has not been a single 
incident where officials get sanctioned for violating open public 
enterprises and institutions obligations. 
In a similar vein, compared to government agencies, public 
enterprises and institutions have also faced less bottom-up pressure 
for their openness performance.  Article 33 of the 2008 OGI 
Regulations specifies that if citizens find an administrative organ has 
failed to fulfill its legal obligations with respect to open government 
information, they may report it to the higher-level administrative 
organ and the latter should investigate and handle it.49  Over the last 
decade or so, governments at different levels have set up this kind of 
citizen complaint system.  For example, cities such as Shanghai, 
 
 45 For the latest results, see DIYICI QUANGUO ZHENGFU WANGZHAN PUCHA 
(第一次全国政府网站普查), http://www.gov.cn/wzpc/2015/ 
[https://perma.cc/8XEJ-Z8Y4] (last visited June 1, 2018). 
 46 Sha Lu (沙璐), Quanguo Zhengfu Wangzhan Choucha 12 Ren bei Diaoli 
huo Mianzhi (全国政府网站抽查 12 人被调离或免职) [Nationwide Random 
Inspection of Government Websites led to 12 Officials Demoted or Removed], 
SINA NEWS (May 17, 2018, 01:17 AM), http://tech.sina.com.cn/i/2018-05-17/doc-
iharvfhu1739279.shtml [https://perma.cc/XR4D-2RYP]. 
 47 Kang Jin (康劲), Gansu Banshu Shizhou Zhengfu Xinxi Gongkai Shehui 
Pingjia Bu Jige (甘肃半数市州政府信息公开社会评价不及格) [Over half of 
Prefectural Governments Failed in the Social Assessment of Open Government 
Information], OGICHINA (Aug. 22, 2017), 
http://www.ogichina.org/article/183/29566.html https://perma.cc/82ML-RRNS]. 
 48 Li Dandan (李丹丹), Hainan Yi Juzhang yin Guanwang Wei Gengxin Bei 
Li’an Shencha Shou Dangzhengji Chufen (海南一局长因官网未更新被立案审
查受党政纪处分) [A Bureau Chief in Hainan was Disciplined due to No Update 
of Governmental Website], XINHUA (Feb. 8, 2017, 7:24 AM),  
http://www.xinhuanet.com/2017-02/08/c_1120427350.htm 
[https://perma.cc/ULM3-XL2J]. 
          49 2008 OGI Regulations, supra note 11, art. 33. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/alr/vol16/iss2/2
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Shenzhen and Guangzhou have all put in place online portals to 
receive OGI-related complaints from the general public; 50  it was 
reported that in 2015 four ministries and 18 provincial governments 
did handle such complaints.51  Yet it is a different story for public 
enterprises and institutions in which no complaint channels have been 
opened up so far.  For instance, although the Guiding Opinions on 
Open Information Work of Public Enterprises and Institutions in the 
Transportation Sector enacted in 2008 required the relevant oversight 
departments to institute telephone helplines or online channels to 
accept public complaints, this requirement remains unrealized today. 
The discussion thus far demonstrates that, though the superior 
to public enterprises and institutions within the administrative 
hierarchy, the oversight departments have been far from effective in 
promoting transparency in public enterprises and institutions.  It is in 
light of these challenges that the 2020 State Council General Office 
Measures stresses in Article 8 that oversight departments at all levels 
shall create a special work system for promptly handling complaints 
concerning information disclosure by public enterprises and 
institutions. 52   Article 9 urges that oversight departments shall 
establish special responsibility clauses and improve enforcement 
against violations by measures such as circulating notices of criticism, 
ordering corrective actions, and enforcing administrative 
punishments.53  Falling short of directly setting out specific rules to 
guarantee transparency of public enterprises and institutions, this 
2020 document nevertheless intends to tighten up top-down 
hierarchical supervision by the oversight departments, which is surely 
to be welcomed.  Yet given the less than satisfactory record over the 
last thirteen years, it is reasonable to doubt that much improvement 
 




[https://perma.cc/6AWK-QWEF]; or http://yjx.sz.gov.cn/ 
[https://perma.cc/BWU8-XEJ5] (last visited June 28, 2018). 
 51 CHINA ACADEMY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES, THIRD-PARTY EVALUATION 
REPORT ON OPEN GOVERNMENT INFORMATION IN CHINA 175 (2015). 
          52 2020 State Council General Office Measures, supra note 20, at art. 8. 
          53 Id. at art. 9. 
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will come to fruition.54  Even if the oversight departments become 
much more motivated, it actually gets more difficult for them to carry 
out top-down scrutiny over the public enterprises and institutions due 
to the absence of information disclosure requests sent by citizens, 
which is mandated by Article 5 of the 2020 State Council General 
Office Measures.55  Without consistent and widespread bottom-up 
feedback from citizens disclosure requests and appeals against non-
disclosure decisions by public enterprises and institutions, it will 
remain challenging for the oversight departments to spot deficiencies 
in an efficient manner. 
Therefore, in the foreseeable future, the oversight 
departments are unlikely to be much more effective in enhancing 
openness in public enterprises and institutions.  There is nothing 
wrong with the 2020 State Council General Office Measures 
attempting to ask them to do more on this front, yet it is unwise to do 
so in a way that cuts off judicial scrutiny over the same issue.  As the 
next section will show, it is precisely the judiciary that has placed 
active yet prudent scrutiny over the transparency performance of 
public enterprises and institutions, in spite of the aforementioned 
institutional limitation. 
IV. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF OPEN PUBLIC ENTERPRISES 
AND INSTITUTIONS AND ITS LIMITATION 
Three issues are most critical to judicial review in this field: 
Who are public enterprises and institutions?  Can their disclosure 
decisions be reviewed in court?  And what standard does the court 
adopt when determining whether a specific piece of information shall 
be released or not?  Respectively, these can be called the problems of 
identification, admissibility, and judgment.  To illustrate the current 
judicial practice on these issues, I compiled a sample of 108 cases 
decided by Chinese prefectural and provincial courts between 2011 
and 2018.56   Overall, the plaintiff’s winning ratio is 24%, which 
 
          54 In fact, the last time any specific rules on open government information 
requirements for public enterprises and institutions got promulgated was in 2010.  
See Hubbard & Xiao, supra note 3. 
          55 2020 State Council General Office Measures, supra note 20, at art. 5. 
 56 On July 14, 2018, I searched the words “public enterprises and institutions” 
and “open information” on pkulaw.cn, one of China’s major online database for 
administrative litigation cases, yielding a total of 366 results, among which there 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/alr/vol16/iss2/2
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means that in less than one fourth of sample cases, the courts ruled 
against the public enterprises and institutions defendants for violating 
legal transparency duties.  While this may seem meager, it should not 
be taken as sign of weak judicial scrutiny. 
On the problem of identification, the primary issue is whether 
the enumeration in Article 37 of the 2008 OGI Regulations should be 
interpreted as exhaustive or non-exhaustive.  If it is exhaustive, then 
only public enterprises and institutions in the nine listed areas such as 
education, medical care, family planning, water supply, and so on are 
obligated to disclose information with reference to the 2008 OGI 
Regulations.  As touched upon above, no oversight departments 
outside the nine listed areas have ever legislated on open public 
enterprises and institutions.  If otherwise, however, then public 
enterprises and institutions in other areas should also do the same as 
long as they are providing public services that are closely related to 
the people’s interests, even if no specific measure is made by 
oversight departments.  Therefore, the scope of Article 37 depends 
practically on if the courts embrace a narrow or broad reading of the 
enumerative list.  Out of the 108 cases surveyed, 82 judgments ruled 
that the defendants are public enterprises and institutions, among 
which 36 are outside the listed categories (see Chart 1).  For instance, 
in a 2013 case in Nanyang City of Henan, the prefectural court 
recognized the municipal branch of China Mobile as a public 
enterprise providing public services closely related to people’s 
interests, which shall disclose information with reference to the OGI 
Regulations, even though the telecommunication industry is not listed 
in Article 37.57  This means that the Chinese courts actually take a 
quite liberal reading of Article 37 in order to expand its purview to 
cover as many public enterprises and institutions as possible, despite 
the lack of an unequivocal statutory basis or specific measures. 
 
 
were 199 decided by the prefectural and provincial courts.  After sifting through 
and removing the irrelevant and repetitive cases, 108 cases were left for closer 
examination.  
 57 Wang Jucai Su Zhongguo Yidong Nanyang Fengongsi Xinxi Gongkaian 
(王聚才诉中国移动南阳分公司信息公开案) [Wang Jucai v. Nanyang Branch 
of China Mobile] (Nanyang Interm. Ct. May 25, 2013), https://bit.ly/3ukN7TQ 
[https://perma.cc/5LG7-TJ2Q]. 
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Regarding the problem of admissibility, as mentioned above, 
because public enterprises and institutions are not considered 
administrative subjects, they are, in theory, excluded from judicial 
review.  This is the key reason undergirding the dualistic structure 
embedded in the 2008 OGI Regulations.58  But the practice of China’s 
courts tells a different story.  Out of the 82 cases where the courts 
identified the accused party as a public enterprise or institution, there 
are 76 in which public enterprises and institutions were held to be 
proper subjects of judicial review.  How did the Chinese courts 
manage to do this?  Judging from the court decisions examined in this 
article, four ways can be identified.  First, some courts simply ignored 
the admissibility obstacle by not mentioning the non-administrative 
subject status of the accused public enterprises and institutions.  
Instead, they directly recognized public enterprises and institutions as 
proper defendants in administrative litigation.  For example, in a 2015 
case, the Second Intermediate Court of Beijing held that according to 
Article 37, public enterprises and institutions’ open information work 
shall be carried out with reference to the 2008 OGI Regulations, 
Article 33 of which stipulates that violation of open information 
duties can be reviewed in courts.  Hence, such alleged infringement 
by public enterprises and institutions should also be open to judicial 
review.59  Second, some courts did admit that public enterprises and 
 
          58 See 2008 OGI Regulations, supra note 11. 
 59 See Xia Xin Su Beijing Xiehe Yiyuan Xinxi Gongkaian (夏欣诉北京协和
医院信息公开案) [Xia Xin v. Beijing Union Hospital] (Beijing Second Interm. 
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institutions are not administrative subjects, but nonetheless ordered 
that they should be open to judicial review due to their special status.  
An illuminating example can be found in a 2016 case decided by a 
court in Nanjing, which pointed out that although the Nanjing 
Electricity Company was neither an administrative organ nor an 
administrative subject, it should still be distinguished from an 
ordinary enterprise. 60   The court ruled that providing electricity 
services to the general public, the company was undoubtedly closely 
related to the people’s interests and therefore should be subject to 
administrative litigation with regard to its open information 
activities.61  Third, still there are some courts that identified public 
enterprises and institutions as empowered organizations, which are 
susceptible to administrative litigation according to Article 36 of the 
2008 OGI Regulations.  This is done by taking Article 37 to be an 
authorizing clause of an administrative regulation (namely the OGI 
Regulations) for public enterprises and institutions to perform a 
public function (namely providing public services) so that public 
enterprises and institutions can qualify as empowered organizations 
too. 62   The fourth way is to deny that having the status of 
administrative subjects is necessary for admissibility in 
administrative litigation.  The reason is that open government 
information shall be considered as a different kind of administrative 
action centering on public service from those administrative actions 
focusing on public administration such as administrative licensing 
and administrative penalty.  Therefore, open government information 
decisions should be subject to a different set of admissibility rules and 
 
 60 Nanjing Shi Fengshang Guoji Gongyu Zhuzhai Xiaoqu Yezhu Weiyuanhui 
Su Guowang Jiangsu Sheng Dianli Gongsi Nanjing Gongdian Gongsi Xinxi 
Gongkai’an (南京市锋尚国际公寓住宅小区业主委员会诉国网江苏省电力公
司南京供电公司信息公开案) [Residents’ Committee of Nanjing Fengshang 
International Apartments v. Nanjing Electricity Company of State Grid] Co., Ltd.] 
(Nanjing Railway Ct. July 27, 2016), https://bit.ly/2Pwzout 
[https://perma.cc/3UAD-7PYT]. 
 61 Residents’ Committee of Nanjing Fengshang International Apartments v. 
Nanjing Electricity Company of State Grid] Co., Ltd. (Nanjing Railway Ct. July 
27, 2016).  
 62 Sun Baomei Su Beijing Shi Xicheng Qu Fangwu Tudi Jingying Guanli 
Zhongxin Xinxi Gongkai’an (孙宝妹诉北京市西城区房屋土地经营管理中心信
息公开案) [Sun Baomei v. Beijing Xicheng District Housing and Land 
Management Center] (Beijing Xicheng Dist. Ct. Apr. 14, 2014), 
https://bit.ly/3wxgmVb [https://perma.cc/3RGM-D26C]. 
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not require the accused parties to be administrative subjects to qualify 
as proper defendants in administrative litigation.63 
With respect to the problem of judgment, among the 76 cases 
where the accused public enterprises and institutions were regarded 
duly defendants, there were only 21 cases in which the courts ruled 
that public enterprises and institutions broke the law by withholding 
information that should be disclosed.  This means that while Chinese 
courts have been very liberal in recognizing public enterprises and 
institutions and their status as appropriate defendants, they uphold a 
relatively stringent standard when it comes to whether or not the 
implicated information should be released by public enterprises and 
institutions with reference to the 2008 OGI Regulations.  As 
discussed before, Article 37 demands public enterprises and 
institutions to publicize information “made or obtained in the course 
of providing public services.”64  Here, there are two key issues.  First, 
if a piece of information can be categorized as public service 
information under Article 3, and second, if such public service 
information shall be made public.  For the first question, the 
implicated information pertains to public services provided by public 
enterprises and institutions, such as technological standards of 
electricity supply for an electricity company65 and student records for 
a university,66 or related to the infrastructure projects carried out by 
public enterprises and institutions for the provision of public services, 
such as construction of port berths by a port management company67 
 
 63 Peng Wei Su Changsha Yuelu Qu Zhengfu Xinxi Gongkai’an (彭伟诉长
沙市岳麓区政府信息公开案 https://bit.ly/3cTiIpO) [Peng Wei v. Changsha 
Yuelu District Government] (Hunan Provincial High Ct. Mar. 24, 2017),  
[https://perma.cc/H53P-RRYF]. 
 64 OGI Regulations, supra note 8. 
 65 Wang Zhen Bao Su Guowang Shandong Sheng Dianli Gongsi Xinxi 
Gongkai’an (王振宝诉国网山东省电力公司信息公开案) [Wang Zhenbao v. 
Shandong Electricity Company of State Grid Co., Ltd.] (Jinan Interm. Ct. Mar. 8, 
2016), https://bit.ly/2Oqocii [https://perma.cc/JAJ4-J33R]. 
 66 Li Moumou Su Jiaozuo Shifan Gaodeng Zhuanke Xuexiao Xinxi 
Gongkai’an (李某某诉焦作师范高等专科学校信息公开案) [Li Moumou v. 
Jiaozuo Normal School] (Jiaozuo Interm. Ct. Sept. 18, 2017), 
https://bit.ly/2PDQoic [https://perma.cc/TA9K-KDSE]. 
 67 Yan Xiantong Su Wenzhou Wenzhougang Jituan Youxian Gongsi Xinxi 
Gongkai’an (颜贤童诉温州港集团有限公司信息公开案) [Yan Xiantong v. 
Wenzhou Harbor Group Co., Ltd.] (Wenzhou Interm. Ct. Mar. 14, 2017), 
https://bit.ly/31Q1T91[https://perma.cc/EG3G-X9T6]. 
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and laying of underground sewage pipe by a drainage company.68  
Conversely, in those cases where the implicated information is not 
classified as public service information, the judiciary concludes that 
the information at hand is about public enterprises and institutions’ 
internal affairs with no direct bearing on the services they provide to 
the general public, so it need not be made public.69  Moreover, on the 
issue of whether the identified public service information shall be 
released, the courts relied upon the exemptions prescribed in Articles 
8 and 14, which are national security, public security, economic 
security, social stability, national secrets, commercial secrets, and 
privacy.  For example, in a 2015 case, the Nantong intermediate court 
in Jiangsu province maintained that a local branch of China Mobile 
was not violating the law in refusing a citizen’s request to release text 
messages of another customer. 70   The court reasoned that in 
pursuance to Article 65 of the PRC Telecommunication Regulations, 
unless necessary to national security or investigation of a crime and 
carried out by the public security administration, national security 
authority, or people’s procuratorates according to legal procedures, 
no organization or individual may access a user’s telecommunication 
content.71  Hence the plaintiff’s request to release another customer’s 
text messages was rejected, and the accused telecommunication 
company was deemed to be abiding by rather than breaking the law 
in doing so.72 
 
 68 You Hanrui Su Beijing Chengshi Paishui Jituan Gongsi Xinxi Gongkai’an 
(尤瀚睿诉北京城市排水集团公司信息公开案) [You Hanrui v. Beijing 
Municipal Drainage Company Co., Ltd.] (Beijing Second Interm. Ct. May 14, 
2018), https://bit.ly/2OrMIzH [https://perma.cc/LLM7-6N8D]. 
 69 Jia Youbao Su Zhongguo Yidong Shandong Pingdu Fengongsi Xinxi 
Gongkai’an (贾友宝诉中国移动山东平度分公司信息公开案) [Jia Youbao v. 
Shandong Pingdu Branch of China Mobile Co., Ltd.] (Qingdao Interm. Ct. Apr. 
18, 2018), https://bit.ly/3fOEEV4 [https://perma.cc/L3FA-83D6]. 
 70 Wang Dejun Su Zhongguo Yidong Jiangsu Hai’an Fen Gongsi Xinxi 
Gongkai’an (王德军诉中国移动江苏海安分公司信息公开案) [Wang Dejun v. 
Jiangsu Hai’an Branch of China Mobile Co., Ltd.] (Nantong Interm. Ct. Mar. 4, 
2016),  
https://bit.ly/3sYjmI2 [https://perma.cc/G7W7-2GR4]. 
      71 Wang Dejun Su Zhongguo Yidong Jiangsu Hai’an Fen Gongsi Xinxi 
Gongkai’an (王德军诉中国移动江苏海安分公司信息公开案) [Wang Dejun v. 
Jiangsu Hai’an Branch of China Mobile Co., Ltd.] (Nantong Interm. Ct. Mar. 4, 
2016), https://bit.ly/3sYjmI2 [https://perma.cc/G7W7-2GR4]. 
 72 Wang Dejun Su Zhongguo Yidong Jiangsu Hai’an Fen Gongsi Xinxi 
Gongkai’an (王德军诉中国移动江苏海安分公司信息公开案) [Wang Dejun v. 
Jiangsu Hai’an Branch of China Mobile Co., Ltd.] (Nantong Interm. Ct. Mar. 4, 
2016), https://bit.ly/3sYjmI2 [https://perma.cc/G7W7-2GR4]. 
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The previous discussion indicates that Chinese courts have 
been very active yet prudent in scrutinizing the transparency 
performance of public enterprises and institutions, at least prior to the 
2019 amendments to the OGI Regulations.  First, by adopting a non-
exhaustive reading of the enumerative list in Article 37, they have 
effectively placed more public enterprises and institutions in more 
areas under information disclosure obligations.  Second, by 
developing a series of ways to recognize public enterprises and 
institutions as proper defendants in administrative litigation, Chinese 
courts have successfully subjected open information work of public 
enterprises and institutions to judicial review.  Third, while taking a 
generous attitude in accepting challenges to disclosure decisions of 
public enterprises and institutions, Chinese courts have been careful 
when ordering public enterprises and institutions to release requested 
information.  On the one hand, many courts have displayed respect to 
managerial independence of public enterprises and institutions by not 
categorizing information related to their internal affairs without direct 
bearings on their public service provision as public service 
information.  On the other hand, courts have also made use of the 
statutory exemptions to open government information in order to 
prevent information disclosure by public enterprises and institutions 
from infringing upon public interests, such as national security and 
privacy.  In this circumstance, the ambiguity in applying the 2008 
OGI Regulations to public enterprises and institutions has been 
reduced by a considerable degree. 
That being said, the institutional limitation placed over 
judicial scrutiny in this area by the dualistic structure cannot be 
ignored or understated.  For instance, none of the aforementioned four 
ways the courts bypassed the admissibility obstacle are based on solid 
legal ground.  It is a long-entrenched rule in Chinese administrative 
law that to qualify as a proper defendant in an administrative 
litigation, the entity must have the status of administrative subject.  
To ignore or deny this is strictly speaking against the law.  Similarly, 
to bypass this via conflating public enterprises and institutions under 
Article 37 with empowered organizations under Article 36 is also 
legally dubious because Article 37 should not be seen as authorizing 
public enterprises and institutions to provide public services, but 
rather as obligating them to be as open as possible.  In this situation, 
Chinese courts have been walking a very fine line in accepting legal 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/alr/vol16/iss2/2
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challenges to public enterprises and institutions’ open information 
work. 
Nonetheless, on the whole, it is the courts, not the oversight 
departments, that have taken the lead in promoting transparent public 
enterprises and institutions in China during the first decade of 
enforcement of the 2008 OGI Regulations.  Though better positioned 
to do so, the oversight departments across the country have 
nonetheless failed to exercise robust hierarchical supervision or exert 
adequate top-down pressure over public enterprises and institutions 
to promote better transparency.  In contrast, Chinese courts have 
cautiously but resolutely taken the initiative to ensure that public 
enterprises and institutions disclose information according to law.  
Therefore, the conventional wisdom that the oversight departments 
are effective in and the judiciary is incapable of strengthening open 
public enterprises and institutions belies the reality.  To be clear, this 
is neither to say that the oversight departments are useless nor that the 
judiciary alone can do the job.  Rather, it is to say that in order to 
achieve better transparency of public enterprises and institutions, 
both internal/hierarchical supervision by the oversight departments 
and external/independent scrutiny by the courts are needed.  Seen in 
this light, the recent legal change to reinforce the existing dualistic 
structure in the OGI Regulations is problematic, and the more 
desirable alternative is to remove this structure and place public 
enterprises and institutions on an equal footing with the government 
under the same OGI Regulations.  On this point, there are two 
counterarguments remaining to be addressed: first, an open public 
enterprises and institutions system is by nature different from open 
government; second, China’s practice of imposing legal transparency 
duties on public enterprises and institutions deviates from the 
international mainstream practice. 
V. CONSTITUTIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL 
PERSPECTIVES ON OPEN PUBLIC ENTERPRISES AND 
INSTITUTIONS 
The conventional wisdom maintains that regulated public 
enterprises and institutions should not be subject to freedom of 
information legislation but should be made open according to 
compulsory disclosure requirements stipulated by special rules 
established by relevant oversight departments.  This is, however, 
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rooted in a misunderstanding of the constitutional role of open public 
enterprises and institutions in China.  Admittedly, public enterprises 
and institutions are regulatees.73   For example, gas companies in 
China are regulated by the Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural 
Development and schools and universities by the Ministry of 
Education.74  This is similar to the situation in the West where public 
utilities and schools are heavily regulated.  Yet in the constitutional 
sense, public enterprises and institutions in China are also the 
channels through which Chinese people manage social and economic 
affairs, just like the government, which is rather different from other 
countries.   
There are three paragraphs in Article 2 of the current PRC 
Constitution.75  The first paragraph lays down the principle of popular 
sovereignty by prescribing that all power in the PRC belongs to the 
people.  On this foundation, the next two paragraphs set out two forms 
of people’s sovereignty in China.  Paragraph 2 reads: “The National 
People’s Congress and the local people’s congresses at various levels 
are the organs through which the people exercise state power.”  
Paragraph 3 reads: “The people administer State affairs and manage 
economic and cultural undertakings and social affairs through various 
channels and in various ways in accordance with the provisions of 
law.”  Apparently, in addition to elective democracy embodied in the 
people’s congress system, the Chinese Constitution also embraces 
participatory democracy through various channels and in various 
ways.76   From the outset, China’s initiative on open government 
 
          73 This is clearly demonstrated by the fact that both Article 37 of the 2008 
OGI Regulations and Article 55 of the 2019 OGI Regulations ask the oversight 
departments to be responsible for improving transparency of public enterprises 
and institutions.   
          74 For an analysis of the regulatory landscape of public utilities in China, see 
Jean-Jacques Laffont, Management of Public Utilities in China, 5 ANNALS OF 
ECONOMICS AND FINANCE 189 (2004) (pointing out that China has a mixed 
structure of regulatory agencies consisting of both industry-wide and sectoral 
agencies for public utilities). 
          75 The full text English translation can be found at  
http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/lawsregulations/201911/20/content_WS5ed88
56ec6d0b3f0e9499913.html [https://perma.cc/627A-8EAH] (last visited Apr. 20, 
2021). 
          76 For a discussion on participatory governance in China, see Wang Xixin, & 
Zhang Yongle, The Rise of Participatory Governance in China: Empirical 
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information was intended to enhance participatory democracy.  As 
early as in 2003, five years prior to the implementation of the OGI 
Regulations, the expert team assembled to draft China’s own freedom 
of information law suggested that, although the Chinese Constitution 
does not explicitly provide for citizen’s right to information, it does 
provide basis for legislation on open government information through 
the third paragraph in Article 2 because establishing the right to 
information is a crucial element to the people’s exercising the power 
to administer affairs of the state, and society and is thereby the 
concretization of the constitutional mandate.77  In 2016, Opinions on 
Comprehensively Promoting Open Administrative Affairs issued 
jointly by the General Office of the Communist Party of China and 
General Office of the State Council reaffirmed that promoting open 
administrative affairs and making public power to operate under the 
sunshine is of critical importance to the development of socialist 
democratic politics.78  This is not difficult to understand since an open 
and transparent government is the precondition to the people’s 
effective supervision over and meaningful participation in the 
government. 
The same can be said about open public enterprises and 
institutions.  Circling back to the beginning of this article, public 
enterprises and institutions are a legacy of China’s pre-reform era that 
continue to perform a variety of public functions and/or receive 
public funds.  In this vein, they are essentially on par with the 
government as the channels through which Chinese people manage 
social and economic affairs.  Therefore, public enterprises and 
institutions should be placed under the same transparency obligations 
as the government in order to enhance participatory democracy in 
China.  As a matter of fact, according to the official narrative in China, 
historically speaking, open public enterprises and institutions and 
 
Models, Theoretical Framework, and Institutional Analysis, 13 U. Pa. Asian L. 
Rev. (2018).  
 77 ZHOU HANHUA(周汉华), ZHENGFU XINXI GONGKAI TIAOLI JIANYI GAO; 
CAO’AN · SHUOMING · LIYOU · LIFA LI (政府信息公开条例专家建议稿:草案·说
明·理由·立法例）[EXPERT SUGGESTED DRAFT OF OGI REGULATIONS: DRAFT, 
EXPLANATION, REASONS AND PRECEDENTS] 43–44 (2013). 
          78 The full text English translation can be found at 
https://law.yale.edu/sites/default/files/area/center/china/document/2016-
2_en_jt_promoting_open_government_opinions.pdf [https://perma.cc/QMZ8-
WN6P] (last visited Apr. 20, 2021). 
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open government both originated from the same local initiative called 
“Two Openly and One Supervision” in Gaocheng county of Hebei 
province in the late 1980s, aiming at openly disclosing the procedures 
for accessing public services and the results of public service delivery 
to accept public supervision.79  Specifically, this landmark initiative 
focused at first on seven local institutions: the bureau of industry and 
commerce, the taxation administration, electricity supply stations, 
police stations, bank offices, vehicle administration stations, and 
epidemic prevention stations.  Among these seven institutions, there 
are four public enterprises and institutions in the electricity supply 
station, bank office, vehicle administration station and epidemic 
prevention station sectors. 80  In this light, from its origin, China’s 
transparency movement has included open government and open 
public enterprises and institutions, both of which serve to fulfil the 
constitutional mandate for participatory democracy in China.  
Therefore, the dualistic structure in the OGI Regulations that 
separates the two constitutes a breach of this constitutional 
requirement and should be abandoned, not reinforced. 
On the question whether open public enterprises and 
institutions in China depart from the international mainstream, it is 
useful to look at the 2017 Global Right to Information Rating 
conducted by Access Info Europe and Centre for Law and Democracy, 
two NGOs based in Europe working on global transparency issues.  
This rating exercise surveyed the freedom of information legislation 
of 109 states (China included) around the world according to an index 
system consisting of 61 indicators.  Indicator 12 considers whether 
the right of access applies to a) private bodies that perform a public 
function and b) private bodies that receive significant public 
funding.81   Among the 108 states other than China surveyed, as 
shown in Chart 2, only 26 have a transparency law that completely 
 
 79 Stromseth, supra note 2, at 34–35. 
 80 Hebei Gaocheng Supervision Bureau (河北省藁城县监察局), ShiXing 
Liang Gongkai Yi Jiandu Zhidu, Tuijin Zhengfu Jiguan de Lianzheng Jianshe (实
行两公开一监督制度，推进政府机关的廉政建设) [Implementing the Two 
Openly and One Supervision System to Promote Clean Government], in XINSHIQI 
DE XINGZHENG JIANCHA GONGZUO (新时期的行政监察工作) [Administrative 
Supervision In A New Era] 241 (Li Zhilun (李至伦) ed., 1990). 
 81 For the methodology, see RTI Legislation Rating Methodology, CENTRE 
FOR L. & Democracy, www.rti-rating.org/wp-content/uploads/Indicators.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7TRQ-4Q2X] (last visited Sept. 27, 2018). 
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excludes application to private entities performing public functions 
or receiving public funds. 
 
 




functions or receiving 
public funds (48 states) 
 
Asia (8): Sri Lanka, Kazakhstan, 
Georgia, Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, 
Bangladesh, Maldives, Taiwan of 
China 
Europe (18): Denmark, Italy, Ukraine, 
Portuguese, Latvia, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Estonia, Bulgaria, 
Moldova, Slovenia, Poland, Croatia, 
Serbia, Ireland, Kosovo, Macedonia, 
Montenegro, Malta. 
Africa (11): The Republic of Guinea, 
South Africa, Nigeria, Liberia, Cote 
d'Ivoire, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, South 
Sudan, Mozambique, Kenya, Tunis. 
South America (11): Trinidad and 
Tobago, Panama, Mexico, Antigua, 
Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, 
Guatemala, Salvador, Columbia, 
Ecuador, Argentina. 
 




functions (22 states) 
 
Asia (6): Israel, Afghanistan, Iran, 
Jordan, Mongolia, Azerbaijan. 
Europe (11): Albania, Finland, UK, 
Hungary, Norway, Switzerland, Czech 
Republic, France, Liechtenstein, 
Netherlands, Germany. 
Africa (3): Angola, Nigeria, Togo. 
South America (2): Peru, Belize. 
 
Freedom of information 
legislation covering 
private entities receiving 
public funds (12 states) 
Asia (5): India, Nepal, Yemen, 
Indonesia, South Korea 
Europe (1): Romania.  
Africa (2): Ethiopia, Burkina Faso. 
Oceania (1): New Zealand. 
South Africa (3): Honduras, Brazil, 
Guyana. 
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Freedom of information 
legislation not covering 
private entities (26 
states) 
 
Asia (8): Thailand, Uzbekistan, Japan, 
Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkey, 
Philippines, Vietnam. 
Europe (7): Sweden, Greece, Belgium, 
Austria, Lithuania, Spain, Russia. 
Africa (2): Zimbabwe, Uganda. 
South America (5): Chile, Uruguay, 
Jamaica, Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines, Paraguay. 
North America (2): USA, Canada. 
Oceania (2): Australia, Cook Islands. 
Chart 2 
Contrary to the conventional wisdom, therefore, China is in 
line with most states that have freedom of information legislation to 
incorporate non-governmental entities performing public functions 
and/or receiving public funds into such legislation.  In this respect, 
the United States’ Freedom of Information Act, which served as a 
primary inspiration to China’s 2008 OGI Regulations, is not a rule 
but an exception for only covering federal agencies.  In fact, there is 
a notable trend that openness laws passed more recently, especially 
after 2000, tend to apply to non-governmental bodies, as shown in 
Chart 3.  The Chinese OGI Regulations is therefore actually in tune 
with the global trend and should not be seen as a deviation from the 
international mainstream. 
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This article has tackled a less-researched issue regarding 
China’s first nationwide transparency law: the openness of public 
enterprises and institutions, namely those entities outside the 
government performing public functions and/or receiving public 
funds.  Given their public nature, the transparency performance of 
public enterprises and institutions has huge implications for not only 
the everyday life of Chinese citizens but also the development of a 
more open political and administrative regime in the People’s 
Republic.  But the dualistic structure in the 2008 OGI Regulations 
and the 2019 amendments that have further reinforced this structure 
do more harm than good to promote open public enterprises and 
institutions in China.  They contradict the proven record that it is the 
judiciary rather than the oversight departments that has taken the lead 
in promoting openness in public enterprises and institutions during 
the last decade, notwithstanding the institutional obstacle created by 
the dualistic structure.  The real challenge to open public enterprises 
and institutions in China, therefore, is more institutional than 
practical, and the embedded dualism in the OGI Regulations needs to 
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to the same terms and judicial scrutiny for their open information 
work as the government. 
The question then becomes, how can this be achieved?  As 
mentioned repeatedly in this article, public enterprises and 
institutions remain non-administrative subjects immune to judicial 
review.  This is why administrative litigation as a remedy has been 
abandoned under the 2019 OGI Regulations.  Without a change in the 
Administrative Litigation Law,82 the only feasible way to bypass this 
barrier is to make the complaint mechanism a procedural prerequisite 
for administrative litigation.  Specifically, as mentioned, Article 55 
of the 2019 OGI Regulations provides that citizens can file 
complaints against information disclosure decisions by public 
enterprises and institutions to the oversight departments, which shall 
then handle these complaints and notify the petitioners about the 
results.  This, however, should not be the end of the matter.  Instead, 
it should be prescribed that the complaint process must be exhausted 
before the judiciary can step in to review the decisions by the 
oversight departments in handling citizens’ complaints.  In this 
situation, public enterprises and institutions remain directly 
unreviewable but become reviewable indirectly for their open 
information work.  Meanwhile, it should also be stipulated that public 
enterprises and institutions will disclose information according to, not 
just with reference to, the OGI Regulations so that they can be placed 
under the same transparency terms as the government.  Any special 
rules promulgated by the oversight departments shall not breach the 
OGI Regulations.  The stipulation in Article 5 of the 2020 State 
Council General Office Measures that largely bans citizens sending 
disclosure requests to public enterprises and institutions should 
 
 82 During the deliberation process of the amendments to the 1989 
Administrative Litigation Law in 2014, some people’s representatives suggested 
that as the administrative reform deepens in China, more and more self-governing 
organizations, industrial associations, public enterprises and institutions, and 
social groups begin to take on public administrative functions that are closely 
related to the people’s interests.  The disputes arising as a result demand judicial 
resolution, and non-administrative subjects should be made susceptible to 
administrative litigation.  However, this suggestion was not adopted in the final 
version of the 2014 Administrative Litigation Law.  See Shi’er Jie Quanguo 
Renda Changweihui Di Liu Ci Huiyi Shenyi Xingzheng Susongfa Xiuzheng’an 
Cao’an De Yijian (十二届全国人大常委会第六次会议审议行政诉讼法修正案
草案的意见) [Opinions About Draft Amendments to the Administrative 
Litigation Law at the Sixth Meeting of the Twelfth National People’s Congress 
Standing Committee] (Dec. 25, 2014). 
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therefore be reversed.  Alternatively, oversight departments should at 
least make sure that their special rules on transparency of public 
enterprises and institutions leave room for disclosure upon requests, 
since Article 5 only states that such a disclosure method shall not in 
principle be adopted.  All of this may not guarantee full compliance 
of public enterprises and institutions with the OGI Regulations, but it 
surely is a necessary first step in that direction. 
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